Production-based asset pricing models typically abstract from frictions in the labor market. By construction these models therefore do not match the dynamic behavior of variables such as wages and hours worked. This is potentially a great concern when considering the time-series properties of the value and payout of the …rm since about two-thirds of …rms'earnings are used to pay labor costs. We show that adding these frictions to a real business cycle model that features endogenous long-run consumption risk, signi…cantly helps the model explain unconditional asset pricing moments and provides a rationale for the relationship between return predictability and ‡uctuations in labor income.
Introduction
Production-based asset pricing models aim to explain asset prices through the optimal investment behavior of …rms given a production function, costs of factor inputs and a stochastic discount factor. In terms of the magnitude of factor costs, labor is the most signi…cant one. In the U.S. economy, labor costs has historically amounted to about two thirds of …rms' revenues. Importantly, there is an abundance of evidence that labor markets are not frictionless: Wages are sticky and there are costs to hiring and …ring that depend on the state of the economy (see, e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994 , Donaldson and Danthine, 1999 , and Hall, 2005 . Therefore, wages empirically do not equal the marginal product of labor. Yet production-based asset pricing models typically ignore labor markets altogether or simply assume that labor is paid its marginal product. This is an issue because the costs of labor market frictions can be large. In a rational expectations equilibrium, the optimal investment policy will then be signi…cantly di¤erent from the frictionless case. What is more, sluggish adjustment of labor costs gives the …rm operating leverage relative to the frictionless case. These facts are important for the dynamic behavior of aggregate dividends and therefore for the asset pricing properties of these models.
In this paper, we consider the e¤ects of labor market frictions in the context of a standard real business cycle model where the representative agent has Epstein-Zin preferences and technology shocks are i.i.d. In this model, long-run consumption risk as in Bansal and Yaron (2004) arises endogenously due to agents' desire to smooth consumption (see Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer, 2007) . It is useful to consider a general equilibrium model with both production and consumption, as opposed to a pure production-based model (as in, e.g., Jermann, 2007) , since frictions that a¤ect investment behavior and capital productivity also a¤ect the optimal consumption choice and, therefore, potentially the amount of long-run versus short-run consumption risk in the economy. We show in this paper that introducing labor market frictions that allow the model to match key aggregate labor market moments, signi…cantly improves the model's asset pricing properties.
We depart from the standard model in that labor is pre-determined one period in advance (e.g., Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher, 2000) , wages are sticky (e.g., Hall, 2005) , and there are asymmetric adjustment costs to labor, i.e., it is more costly for the …rm to …re than to hire. The latter assumption is consistent with new evidence provided in this paper that the sensitivity of wages to changes in labor productivity is higher in expansions than in recessions. These deviations from the standard model allow us to match the fact that wages are less volatile than output, that total number of hours worked is pro-cyclical, and that the labor share of output is counter-cyclical. Further, adding these frictions to the model improve on its asset pricing properties. In particular, the two …rst assumptions make labor costs sluggish. In this case, when a …rm experiences a technology shock, the marginal product of labor changes and the …rm would therefore like to change its labor stock. Being restricted from doing so e¤ectively creates operating leverage. Dividends become more pro-cyclical and volatile relative to the benchmark case where labor can be adjusted frictionlessly. We show that this channel alone almost triples the volatility of the equity claim, which is much too low in the benchmark model, while the amount of long-run consumption risk is largely una¤ected. A levered version of the equity claim in the model has a risk premium of 3:25%, return volatility of 8:9% and a Sharpe ratio of 0:37 even though the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is only 5. When we increase the risk aversion coe¢ cient to 10, we match the historical equity risk premium of 6:3%, although the equity Sharpe ratio in this case is too high (0:74).
Asymmetric adjustment costs to capital and, in particular, labor induce time-varying expected excess returns related to ‡uctuations in labor income. In a recession the …rm wants to decrease its labor stock, but faces higher than normal adjustment costs. This leads to higher return volatility and a higher equity premium. Time-variation in the equity premium has been documented in many studies, but importantly Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) and Santos and Veronesi (2006) argue that ‡uctuations in labor income are important for understanding this predictability. Our model provides a rationale for the link between labor income and expected aggregate stock returns that is missing in production-based models without labor market frictions. Merz (1995) is an early paper that introduce a labor market matching model into a real business cycle model where the representative agent has power utility preferences. She shows that doing so greatly improves the ability of the model to match key aggregate labor market moments. Hall (2005) argues for introducing sticky wages into the matching model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) through time-varying bargaining power between the …rm and the worker. Den Haan and Kaltenbrunner (2007) is a recent real business cycle model that features both sticky wages and a matching model. While our speci…cation of labor market frictions is of a more reduced form, we retain the spirit of the frictions in matching models in that employment is predetermined and costly to adjust. Merz and Yashiv (2007) give strong empirical support for the importance of modeling adjustment costs to both capital and labor in order to match the time-series properties of the value of the aggregate stock market in a production-based pricing framework. The production-based model with long-run consumption risk is also studied in Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2007) and Croce (2008) .
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide the benchmark model without labor market frictions. While we solve the model numerically, we also provide some approximate closed-form solutions to give intuition for how long-run consumption risk arises endogenously. In section 3, we provide the model with labor market frictions and, show following Merz and Yashiv (2007) , how adjustment costs to labor results in a Q with respect to the labor stock, just as the familiar Q with respect to the capital stock arises from capital adjustment costs. Section 4 describes the data and also provide empirical evidence on how the benchmark model fails to match key empirical moments of the aggregate labor market. Section 5 shows the results from the calibrated models. Section 6 argues that the equity claim should not be matched directly with the historical equity risk premium on public equities. Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
[TO COME]
Benchmark Model
Our benchmark model is a real business cycle model where identical households derive utility from consumption and pro…t maximizing …rms use capital and labor to produce output. Investment is subject to convex adjustment costs. Labor is exogenous and in …xed supply.
Firms
We model identical …rms by a representative …rm with a Cobb-Douglas production function, given by
where K t is the capital stock, is the capital share of production, N t is hours worked and Z t is an exogenous technological progress given by
where the shocks " t are i.i.d. The capital accumulation equation is given by
where is the capital depreciation rate and I is investment. The cost of investment is given by
where = 2. We allow a K to be either a constant (symmetric adjustment costs) or countercyclical (asymmetric adjustment costs). The counter-cyclicality is introduced by letting a K take two possible values. When investment is above it's steady-state value,
The amount of labor available to the …rm is …xed. The wage rate is W t and is given by the marginal product of labor. To see this note that the …rm chooses labor and capital to maximize expected discounted pro…ts, given by
subject to the capital accumulation equation (4), where M 0;t is the stochastic discount factor used to …nd the date-0 price of date-t cash ‡ows and D t = F (K t ; N t ) W t N t I t g t is the pro…t or dividend. Therefore, the …rm's value function is
subject to (4). It then follows that the …rm's …rst order conditions are summarized by
and
where the …rm's return on investment is given by
and marginal-q, the shadow price of capital is given by
Note that when there are no adjustment costs, marginal-q is unity.
Households
Identical households are modeled by a in…nitely-lived representative agent who derives utility from consumption and has Epstein-Zin preferences (see Kreps and Porteus (1978) , Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989) ). The date-t utility of the agent, U t , satis…es
where f (x; y) is the Kreps-Porteus intertemporal aggregator, given by
is the rate of time preference, , is relative risk aversion and =
1=
, where is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS). The date-t certainty equivalent operator, t [ ], is given by
where x t+1 is a date-t random variable, which is realized at date t + 1. Epstein-Zin preferences make it possible to separate relative risk aversion from EIS. To understand why this separation is desirable from a microeconomic foundational perspective, observe that relative risk aversion measures aversion to atemporal risk and thus governs the agent's preferences across states. In contrast, EIS is well-de…ned concept under certainty and measures the agent's willingness to postpone consumption over time. Thus, the EIS governs the agent's preferences over time. With standard power utility, this two di¤erent aspects of the agent's preferences are tied together, so that relative risk aversion is the reciprocal of the EIS, i.e. = 1= .
The parameters and also govern the agent's preference for the timing of the resolution of intertemporal uncertainty. When > 1= , the agent prefers to resolve intertemporal uncertainty sooner rather than later, that is, she prefers information to be revealed earlier rather than later, even if she does not use this information in her decisions (see Lazrak (2004) ). When = 1= , the power utility case, the agent is indi¤erent about whether intertemporal uncertainty is resolved sooner or later and when < 1= , she prefers later resolution. In our model, we assume that > 1= .
Households can either consume their wealth or save it by investing in a locally risk-free bond or purchasing shares in the claim to consumption, C = Y I g = D + W N . Hence, the return on the representative agent's portfolio is
where t is the proportion of her savings invested in the claim to consumption, P C is the price of the consumption claim and R f;t+1 is the risk-free return. The representative agent's value function, J, is given by
subject to the budget constraint
where C is the consumption control, as opposed to C, which is result of the …rm's investment decision. Of course, in equilibrium, C = C. The household's …rst order conditions, give us the standard Lucas Euler equation
where R is an asset return. For example, R = R C , where
and the stochastic discount factor, M t+1 = M t;t+1 , is given by
or equivalently
where R A;t+1 is the return on aggregate wealth. Thus,
where A t is cum-dividend aggregate wealth. Note that in equilibrium, market clearing implies that = 1, so the above equation is consistent (in equilibrium) with (17).
The stochastic discount factor above shows that when valuing assets, an agent with Epstein-Zin preferences cares about the path of future consumption, not just the current rate of consumption growth. To see this note that the value function captures the utility of future consumption and that the value function normalized by its certainty equivalent appears in the stochastic discount factor. Thus risks at di¤erent dates are not valued separately. In contrast, for the special case of power utility, the stochastic discount factor no longer depends on the normalized value function, and thus shocks to the path of future consumption growth are not priced-only current consumption growth matters.
Using a log-linear approximation, we can show that the risk premium on an asset is given by
where c = ln C and c t+1 = c t+1 c t . The above expression shows that the risk premium is high when either returns covary strongly (and negatively) with consumption growth (the standard term which also appears when the agent has power utility) or returns covary strongly with the value function (an additional term which is present only when agent's have a preference for the timing of the resolution of intertemporal risk, i.e. 6 = 1= ).
Central Planner' s Solution
The equilibrium of the decentralized economy described above is the same as the equilibrium chosen by a central planner, who has Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences. We use this approach to compute equilibrium prices and quantities. Once we have solved for consumption and labor income, L = W N , we can value these cash ‡ows using the stochastic discount factor. Hence, we obtain the price of the claim to aggregate consumption, P C , given by
the price of the claim to labor income, P L , given by
Since dividends are given by D t = C t W t N t , the price of the claim to dividends is P D;t = P C;t P L;t . Note that the price of the claim to dividends equals the maximized expected present value of the …rm's discounted pro…ts in (6). We can also …nd the risk-free state, R f;t+1 , via the stochastic discount factor since
A Closed-Form Solution
For the special case of g = 0, i.e. zero adjustment costs we can obtain an approximate closed form solution to the continuous-time version of the central planner's problem. This closed-form approach has the advantage that we can derive the dynamics of the capital stock, consumption growth and labor income. We obtain a closed-form solution by solving the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation via a perturbation expansion around the case of = 1. The following proposition provides …rst order expressions for the representative agent's value function, J, and optimal consumption, C, in terms of capital, K, and exogenous parameters. While not as accurate as the numerical solution we use in subsequent sections, the closed form nature of the approximate solutions provides some useful insights.
Proposition 1
The representative agent's value function, J, and optimal consumption, C, are given by
where
(1 ) and c 0 = (1 )(1 ) + " is the optimal consumptioncapital ratio when = 1.
From the above proposition we can see that when = 1, the optimal consumption-capital ratio is constant and since capital growth is locally risk-free, so is consumption growth. This is no longer the case when 6 = 1: the elasticity of consumption with respect to technological progress is
which is non-zero because income and substitution e¤ects no longer o¤set each other. From Proposition 1, we can derive …rst order expressions for the evolution of capital and consumption, investment, labor income and dividends.
Proposition 2 The joint dynamics of log capital, k = ln K, and the log of technology, z = ln Z, are given by
where w is a standard Brownian motion, n = ln N , and
The dynamics of log consumption, c = ln C, are given by
The dynamics of log labor income, l = ln W N , are given by
The dynamics of log dividends, = ln D, are given by
is the ratio of dividends to consumption.
The above proposition shows that log-capital converges exponentially to a steady-state value of A B + n + z at the rate B. More importantly, log-consumption is mean-reverting, with long-run mean A B + n + z and a rate of mean reversion of B. This implies that there is long-run risk in consumption growth, which arises endogenously as a consequence of the agent's optimal behaviour, even though the exogenous technology shock is i.i.d. This is an analytical con…rmation of the numerical results in Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2007) . We can see that log-consumption is mean reverting unless =1, i.e. the technology is linear K. When = 1, log consumption is mean reverting and locally risk-free, so the expected growth rate of consumption is subject to long-run risk.
Log labor income is also subject to long-run risk, but in contrast with log consumption is still volatile when = 1.
The dynamics of log dividends are more complex that those of log consumption or log labor income, although it is still apparent that expected dividend growth is subject to long run risk.
We can obtain the risk-free rate and market price of consumption risk from the stochastic discount factor, M . It is a standard result that the stochastic discount factor, M , is given
where, r, is the locally risk-free rate and, , is the price of consumption risk. To leading order, we can show that
where r 0 and r 1 are constants given in the Appendix. Thus we can see that increasing risk aversion increases the price of consumption risk and decreasing the capital share has the same e¤ect, because it reduces the ability of the central to control the growth rate of capital via investment. Recall that c 0 = (1 )(1 ) + " is the consumption-capital ratio when = 1. Therefore c 0 is decreasing in (assuming + < 1), since the agent consumes less of the capital stock and saves more as her aversion to non-smooth consumption declines. Consequently, the market price of risk increases with the EIS, as found numerically in Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2007) .
The risk-free rate is linear in log-consumption and the log of technological progress, so the term structure implied by our model will be a¢ ne.
We can in principle compute asset prices in closed-form. The resulting expressions for risk premia are zero to …rst order 1. That implies that in the benchmark model without adjustment costs risk premia are small. We know from Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2007) that this is true even with adjustment costs.
Full Model
In the full model households behave in exactly the same way as in the benchmark model. The key di¤erences lie in the behavior of …rms.
Firms
We now assume that the labor available to …rms follows an accumulation equation and is subject to adjustment costs. Hence,
where H is the number of new hires. The capital accumulation equation is now given by
Both labor and investment are subject to adjustment costs, the sum of which is given by
We allow for both symmetric adjustments costs where a N and a K are constants and asymmetric adjustment costs, where a N and a K take higher values when the …rm …res workers (H t < 0) or disinvest relative to the steady state ( It Kt < ). In the next section, we will provide new empirical evidence that supports the assumption of higher adjustment costs to labor when the …rm scales down its labor stock.
Adjustment costs reduce consumption, and so
The …rm's problem is to maximize expected discounted pro…ts
subject to the labor and capital accumulation equations, (45) and (46), respectively. We can derive the …rst order conditions of the …rm in the same way as for the benchmark model. The return on hiring is given by
where Q N is the shadow price of hiring, given by
The …rst order conditions associated with capital and investment remain unchanged.
Determination of Wages
We assume that wages are given exogenously. One speci…cation we use is that wages are predetermined. Hence, (52) implies that
which is equivalent to
We can gain some intuition for the above expression by noting that if there are no adjustment costs it reduces to
which means that he present value of next period's wages equals the expected market value of the marginal product of labor. The other speci…cation we use is that wages are sticky and given by
The parameter governs the level of stickiness. A lower means more stickiness. It follows from the above two equations that wages are given by
which makes it easy to see that when is smaller, wages load less heavily on the current technology shock and are hence more sticky.
Asset Prices and the New Q
We restate the following proposition based on Merz and Yashiv (2005) .
Proposition 3
The expected present value of the …rm's discounted pro…ts, i.e. dividends is given by
where Q K t is marginal-q, the shadow price of capital and Q N t is the shadow price of employment.
The above proposition tells us that the value of the …rm does not just depend on the shadow price of capital and it's level, but also on the shadow price of employment and it's level. Note that while the shadow price of capital is one when capital adjustment is costless, the shadow price of employment is zero when labor adjusts costlessly. The reason is that while investment a¤ects the growth rate of capital directly, hiring does not.
The new term, Q N t N t+1 , in the …rm's value will lead to an additional component in the risk premium. Furthermore, combined with asymmetric adjustment costs for labor the extra term provides a channel for linking time variation in labor with time variation in returns and thus providing some underpinnings for the results on stock return predictability and labor income in Santos and Veronesi (2004) .
Data
The data used in this paper are taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We use the long annual sample from 1929 2006 when available for computing aggregate quantity moments. Otherwise, we use the quarterly data available from 1952 to 2006. All variables have been de ‡ated using the Personal Consumption Expenditures de ‡ator. The model does not have a government sector or durable consumption, although these are quantitatively signi…cant fractions of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In the post-WWII sample, government consumption and expenditures has been on average 20% of GDP, while durable consumption has been on average 8.5% of GDP and 13% of Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE). Thus, the model does not account for 28.5% of the total output. This facts complicates calibration of the model as it is not altogether clear which moments to match. In our calibration of the model, we use the variables as de…ned below to compute sample moments.
Output
The data as given by NIPA allows for a relatively clear separation of government consumption and investment from private consumption and investment. Therefore, it seems pertinent and is standard to exclude the government sector from the de…nition of the output of the economy for the purposes of calibrating this model.
Investment
Since the model does not explicitly feature durable goods, we follow Cooley and Prescott (1995) and de…ne durable consumption expenditures plus gross private investments as aggregate investments.
Consumption
We de…ne aggregate consumption as nondurable plus services consumption expenditures. Strictly speaking we should also impute the service ‡ow from the stock of durables as a part of aggregate consumption. However, in the calibration we ignore this component so the consumption data is consistent with what has been used in the long-run risk asset pricing literature.
Asset Pricing Moments
The asset pricing moments are taken from Bansal and Yaron (2004) . We use these moments so the results are easy to compare to the …ndings from this paper. We will also report some moments for the return to the aggregate wealth portfolio which are taken from Lustig, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Verdelhan (2008) .
Aggregate Labor Market Moments
The data in this section is taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics'releases for the nonfarm business sector, as is standard in the literature. The available data is from 1947Q1 -2007Q4. The real wage rate is de…ned as real total compensation divided by total hours worked. Note that this measure of labor input includes variations in the level of employment as the total hours worked will increase if more workers are employed (holding the average number of hours worked constant).
First note that labor productivity is de…ned as output over number of hours and can therefore be related to the marginal product of labor in the frictionless model as follows:
In the case of no adjustment costs to labor (and no boundary solution in terms of available labor supply), we have that in equilibrium
That is, the …rm demands labor, N t , until the marginal product of labor equals the given wage rate. Further, this relation implies that the labor share is constant:
Both of these conditions are strongly violated in the data, as Table 1 shows. The volatility of wages is less than half the volatility of output and also less than the volatility of labor productivity. Hours worked is almost as volatile as output and the labor share is half as volatile as output -i.e., it is far from constant. The lower part of the table shows the historical correlations between these variables. Hours worked, are strongly pro-cyclical while wages and labor productivity are less so. Thus, wages appear to be sticky relative to the predictions of the standard model. The labor share is counter-cyclical, implying that the capital share is pro-cyclical. This is important, as it turns out, for the volatility of the equity claim. We draw two important conclusions from this data. First, wages are sticky in that they are not highly correlated with and less volatile than output. Second, there is a wedge between labor productivity and wages that is unexplained by the standard model. Amending the model so it can explain these features of the data will also enable us to explain the high volatility and pro-cyclicality of hours worked and the counter-cyclical labor share. Figure 1 shows the di¤erent HP-…ltered labor series relative to output (dashed, red line). 
Sticky Wages and Labor Adjustment Costs
There is a large literature in labor economics that in part seek to explain why in the data the marginal product of labor is di¤erent from the wage rate. In particular, there are important frictions to allocating labor in the economy and this feature has been formalized in, for instance, matching models (see Mortensen and Pissarides (2000) for a review). These models explicitly consider unemployment, matching between …rms and workers and wage determination. In this paper, we will take a more reduced form approach and simply specify adjustment costs to change the labor employed by the …rm. In addition, we will specify an exogenous wage rule. These features allow us to calibrate the model to match the broad aggregate labor market statistics given above. However, …rst we dig a little deeper on the relationship between wages and relative to labor productivity, which is important for specifying the labor adjustment costs and wage rule. In particular, we run the regression:
in order to determine the nature of the deviations between marginal product of labor and wages. We include a time-varying regression coe¢ cient (really, just the squared value of MPL) to uncover any time-variation in this relation related to the business cycle. Table 2 shows that the wage rate is positively related to labor productivity, as we would expect, but more so in expansions (when labor productivity is high). The fact that wages are more sensitive to labor productivity in expansions than in recessions indicates that wages are stickier or adjustment costs higher (or both) in recessions than in expansions. This result is consistent with a world with higher adjustment costs for …ring than hiring and/or a world where it is harder to adjust wages downwards. Figure 2 shows that this time-varying sensitivity t 2 + 3 mpl HP t is economically signi…cant, ranging between 0:15 and 0:55.
In sum, there is substantial evidence of labor market frictions, which has been the subject of much earlier research also within the real business cycle literature (see, e.g., King and Rebelo (2000) and Danthine and Donaldson (1999) ). We document a new …nding, to our 
knowledge, that wages are less sensitive to ‡uctuations in labor productivity in recessions. We include this feature in our model and show that it helps to explain empirical evidence on excess stock market return predictability related to labor market conditions.
Calibrated Models
Here we present our four calibrated models. The …rst two are the standard case with and without asymmetric adjustment costs. Asymmetric adjustment costs are necessary in order to generate return predictability.
Next we present the model with labor frictions, but no adjustment costs. This model matches the stylized labor market facts relatively well, but does not generate any predictability in equity returns.
Finally, we present a model with asymmetric adjustment costs to the labor market as well as for investments. This model generates predictability related to ‡uctuations in both the aggregate investment to capital ratio as well as the aggregate employment / hours worked. Table 3 shows the parameter values for the models. The capital share, , depreciation, , mean technology growth rate, , are given standard values. Further, we choose a relatively Table 3 Calibration (Quarterly) high elasticity of intertemporal substitution of 2 to maximize the models'ability to match the high volatility of investments. We let the coe¢ cient of risk aversion be 5, which is relatively low. These value for EIS and RRA implies that the representative agent has a preference for early resolution of uncertainty, which is what generates a positive price of risk for shocks to expected consumption growth (long-run risk). The previous variables are kept constant across the models. We vary the amount of adjustment costs to both capital and labor, as well as the amount of wage stickiness, across the models and will comment on the e¤ect of these parameters as we go along. All the models are solved numerically. Table 4 shows standard unconditional moments from the four models. All models are calibrated to match the volatility of consumption growth and the relative volatility of consumption to output. Matching this relative volatility is important for getting the right amount of long-run risk in the model, as detailed in Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2007) . All the models therefore generate about the same amount of short-run and long-run risk (volatility of shocks to realized consumption growth and volatility of expected consumption growth, respectively) and the same maximal price of risk (that is, (M ) =E (M ) where M is the stochastic discount factor, as shown by Hansen and Jagannathan, 1992) . This, in turn, means that the Sharpe ratio of equities is about the same in all the models and we match this moment to the historical Sharpe ratio of aggregate equity returns.
Labor Market Moments
The benchmark models, with and without adjustment costs, do not match aggregate labor market moments. In particular, wages are too volatile, hours worked and the labor share (labor income divided by total output) is constant, and wages are too highly (perfectly) correlated with output. In contrast, both the models with sticky wages (with and without adjustment costs) do a signi…cantly better job at matching these moments. As in the data, the labor share is counter-cyclical and about half as volatile as output. This is important for asset pricing moments of the model as it implies that the capital share is pro-cyclical and therefore more risky than in the benchmark models. Further, hours worked and wages are less volatile than output but pro-cyclical, again in line with the data. Thus, the dynamic behavior of the costs of the main factor input in the production function, labor, is signi…cantly better matched with the data in a model that allows for sticky wages.
Investment and Steady-States
The benchmark models cannot match the high volatility of investment. This fact is related Table 4 : This table shows standard annual moments of aggregate quantities and prices for the four models considered in the paper. The models are simulated at a quarterly frequency but all moments are annualized. Notation: c denotes log consumption growth, a HP superscript means the variable has been detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott …lter with standard smoothing parameter equal to 1600, y is log output, c is log consumption, i is log investment, w is log wage rate, n is log hours worked, ls is the labor share (a percentage rate), M is the stochastic discount factor, Fraction LRR denotes the fraction of the maximal Sharpe ratio that is due to long-run risk, SR denotes Sharpe ratio, R A is the return to the claim to aggregate consumption, R f is the risk free rate, and R E is the claim to aggregate dividends (the equity claim). This moment is taken from Bansal, Kiku, and Yaron (2006 to the high steady state investment to output ratios in these models. The high elasticity of intertemporal substitution generates a high savings demand. Therefore, the level of investment in these economies is too high relative to the empirical counterpart. This feeds into investment volatility which now cannot be very high if we are to match the relative volatility of consumption and output. If the base of which volatility is measured relative to is decreased, however, the same level of ‡uctuations would be relatively larger. Perhaps the easiest way to see this is by writing
: For given levels of output and consumption growth volatilities, the percentage ‡uctuations in investment must be lower when the investment to output ratio is higher. This is a signi…cant short-coming of the benchmark models. The models with labor frictions, however, match the empirical value for the average investment to output ratio and therefore also better match the investment volatility. In fact, the model with labor friction and adjustment costs generates the right amount of investment volatility.
Asset Pricing Moments
As mentioned earlier, all the models can match the empirical value for the Sharpe ratio of the equity claim (0:33). Consumption volatility is 2:72% and the risk aversion coe¢ cient is 5. With power utility preferences, this would result in a Sharpe ratio of 0:13. However, due to endogenous consumption-smoothing, there is substantial long-run consumption risk in this economy, as explained in the previous section. In fact, about 60% of the equity premium across the models are due to exposure to long-run consumption risk. The average excess return to the aggregate wealth portfolio is about 2% p.a. across all models, which is very close to the value estimated by Lustig, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Verdelhan (2008) . Furthermore, both the level and volatility of the real risk free rate is matched well by all models, although somewhat better by the labor friction models. Matching these moments also implies that the stochastic discount factor is in line with the data.
The annual equity risk premium for the unlevered …rm is about 0:6% 0:7% in the benchmark models. Even this magnitude is high for frictionless RBC models, but is in this case due to capital adjustment costs. The issue is really to generate enough return volatility. While adding leverage will help somewhat, we are an order of magnitude away from the empirical value. The risk premium for the models with labor frictions is more than twice that of the benchmark models at 1:7% 1:8%. This is not due to increased adjustment costs, as one may think. The model without any adjustment costs (Model 3) has a risk premium of 1:7%. This is due to the fact that sticky wages related to the aggregate capital stock make investing less desirable for the …rm as it also increases the wage level. This leads to a lower average investment to output ratio, which in turn also means a higher dividends to output ratio. In the benchmark model this was in fact negative(!), while the models with labor market frictions has this level more in line with the data. The higher level of dividends make dividends more pro-cyclical which is what increases the equity premium. The equity premium is still substantially below its empirical value, but we will in a later section consider the amount of leverage we should add to this claim to make it closer to the public equity claim we actually have historical data for.
In sum, the models with labor market frictions do reasonable well at matching both aggregate unconditional quantities and prices. Next we turn to conditional moments of equity returns.
Predictability
There is a substantial literature documenting that aggregate excess equity returns are predictable (see, e.g., Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001) . In context of the models consider in this paper, this implies that the equity risk premium is time-varying. As shown in Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2006) and Campanale, Castro, and Clementi (2007) , the standard productionbased model with homoskedastic technology shocks and (relatively) symmetric adjustment costs does not generate economically signi…cant time-variation in expected excess returns. Here we show that the models with asymmetric adjustment costs to capital and labor, on the other hand, are able to do this. Table 5 shows that asymmetric adjustment costs generates long-horizon predictability consistent with what we …nd in the data. Note the large smallsample bias in the R 2 's and the regression coe¢ cient even for the models with no economic predictability. Table 6 shows that the model with labor frictions generates predictability related to labor market ‡uctuations in hours worked. We documented earlier that wages are less sensitive to labor productivity in recessions and the …nal model with labor frictions incorporates this intuition and shows that it leads to quantitatively interesting e¤ects. This is consist with the importance ascribed to ‡uctuations in labor income as discussed in Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) and Santos and Veronesi (2006) .
In sum, asymmetric adjustment costs are necessary in this model to generate time-varying expected equity returns. They do so mainly by increasing price volatility in recessions. Table 5 : The small-sample regressions in the left panels are performed using simulated data from each of the models. The excess return forecasting horizons are 1 quarter, 1 year and 4 years. The data is overlapping at a quarterly frequency and each sample is 240 quarters long (60 years). The reported regression coe¢ cients and t-statistics are the sample averages from running 500 such regressions. The t-statistics reported in parantheses are Newey-West with a lag equal to the number of overlapping periods. The right panels reports population values for the regression coe¢ cients and the R 2 's. One, two, or three asterices denote signi…cance at the ten, …ve, or one percent level or better, respectively. Table 6 : The small-sample regressions in the left panels are performed using simulated data from each of the models. The excess return forecasting horizons are 1 quarter, 1 year and 4 years. The data is overlapping at a quarterly frequency and each sample is 240 quarters long (60 years). The reported regression coe¢ cients and t-statistics are the sample averages from running 500 such regressions. The t-statistics reported in parantheses are Newey-West with a lag equal to the number of overlapping periods. The right panels reports population values for the regression coe¢ cients and the R 2 's. One, two, or three asterices denote signi…cance at the ten, …ve, or one percent level or better, respectively. 6 Which Moment To Match?
The representative …rm in the models analyzed in this paper represents the entire productive sector. That is private equity, and property, as well as the public equity market. In fact, the public equity market represents only a relatively small fraction of private sector production (Heaton and Lucas, 2000) . Furthermore, the average …rm in the stock market index is …nancially levered. Thus, it is not clear that the average stock market return and volatility are the right numbers for us to match with our representative …rm. One way to attack this issue is to consider the aggregate dividends as reported by NIPA versus the aggregate dividends of the publicly traded …rms. Bansal and Yaron (2004) report that the volatility of annual real dividend growth is 11:5%. The volatility of aggregate real annual dividend growth over the same period (1929 -1998) as reported by NIPA, however, is only 6:3%. This implies a "leverage ratio" of 1:83. This is a higher leverage ratio than that we obtain if we consider only …nancial leverage (about 1:33). With this higher leverage ratio, we obtain an equity risk premium of more than 3% for the models with labor market frictions. If one desires to match the level of the equity premium, but not the Sharpe ratio of equities, one can increase the coe¢ cient of risk aversion, , as changing this parameter does not signi…cantly a¤ect quantity dynamics in this model (see also Tallarini (2000) , Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2006), and Croce (2008) ). Table 7 gives the levered equity risk premium and volatility for both = 5 and = 10. With a risk aversion parameter of 10, the models with labor market frictions are able to match the historical risk premium on public equities (6:3%). However, the Sharpe ratio is in this case too high as the return volatility is still about half of its historical value.
Conclusion
We have shown that incorporating labor market frictions that allows a standard productionbased model to match aggregate labor market facts, signi…cantly increases the risk of the equity claim. The sticky labor costs, due to both sticky wages and labor factor adjustment costs, generates operational leverage for the …rm. In particular, investment becomes less attractive as these costs prevent the …rm from maximally exploiting the capital stock relative to the benchmark case where wages are equal to the marginal labor productivity. Thus, investment is less pro-cyclical and dividends is more pro-cyclical and therefore more risky.
We have empirically documented that wages respond less to changes in labor productivity in recessions, a fact that we replicate in our model by allowing for asymmetric adjustment costs to labor. This generates predictability in equity returns related to labor market ‡uc-tuations, which has been shown to be important for explaining asset prices (e.g., Ludvigson, 2001, and Santos and Veronesi, 2005) . In future work, we aim to investigate in more detail the so-called composition e¤ect generated by ‡uctuations in human capital versus …nancial wealth (Du¤ee, 2005, and Santos and Veronesi, 2005) within this class of models. This requires multiple shocks, which is a natural extension. Further, we aim to investigate how the externalities created by sticky wages a¤ects the decentralized competitive equilibrium di¤erently from the social planner problem which we have solved in this paper. A separation of the investment and consumption decision can potentially increase investment volatility, which it is otherwise di¢ cult for the models to fully match. Higher investment volatility would also allow for higher capital adjustment costs, which would help increase equity return volatility.
Appendix

Benchmark Model-Scaled Variables
It is often convenient to work with scaled variables, denoted by a^ :
Lower case variables denote logs. Thus, c = ln C andĉ = lnĈ.
Benchmark Model With No Investment Costs-Closed Form Solution
The capital accumulation equation is
where labor augmenting technological progress, Z, follows a geometric Brownian motion
where w is a standard Brownian motion. The central planner seeks to maximize
subject to to the capital accumulation equation. We introduce scaled variableŝ
Hence, dK
where^ = + 2 . The value function, J, satis…es the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation:
Since, J =Ĵ(K)
, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation simpli…es to give
De…neĵ = lnĴ andk = lnK. Hence,
The FOC for consumption is 
When = 1, the nonlinear ode forĵ can be solved exactly:
Hence, to zeroth order in
where c 0 = (1 )(1 ) + . Note that when < 1 , c 0 > 0 i¤ < 1 1 . This means that cannot be too much larger than 1.
Expanding the ode forĵ around = 1 and substituting in the zeroth order solution gives us a linear ode forĵ 1 . Solving this linear ode subject to the boundary condition thatĵ 1 is …nite as jkj ! 1 gives usĵ (1 ). Therefore, to …rst order in
We can obtain the price of the consumption claim from the value function. To see this note that the representative agent faces an optimal consumption-portfolio choice problem. She seeks to consume a proportion of her wealth and invest the remainder in either the claim to consumption or a locally risk-free bond. Market clearing in the consumption good then implies that P C = Cp C , where 
The capital accumulation equation implies that 
The above approximations imply that dk = 1 + (1 )(n k ) c 0 1 1 c 0 e
(1 )( 1) c 2 0 
The above linear stochastic di¤erential equation can be written more concisely as dk = (Ak + Bn Bk)dt dw; 
The above sde is an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process and has the following well-known solution 
2B
(1 e 2Bs )
It follows that
After some algebra, we can also obtain a …rst order approximation for the evolution of the log of normalized consumptionĉ = lnĈ and hence c. Similarly we can obtain a …rst order approximation for the evolution of the log of labor income, l = ln W N .
We can show that dM M = rdt dz;
where r = r 0 + r 1ĉ (112)
See mathematica …le for details.
Full Model
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof follows Merz and Yashiv (2005) .
The …rst order conditions for the …rm's problem. 
From the …rst reordered FOC it follows that
Therefore
From (120) it follows that
Hence,
which implies that
since
We de…ne
The claim to the above cash ‡ow has price # K t , so
But (128) implies that
Therefore,
We also de…ne the cash ‡ow
the claim to which has price # N t , given by
Similarly to (131), we can show that
Simple algebra shows that the cash ‡ow
is the sum of CF K t and CF K t . Therefore the value of the …rm, P D;t , is given by
